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AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS VERSUS 'RAWHIDE AND RAINBOW':l 
A NOTE ON THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
BY PREXY NESBITT 
PROGRAM SECRETARY 
PCR 
This article reflects the views of the author and not 
necessarily these of the wee or PCR. The author wishes to 
acknowledge the contribution made by Dr. Kevin Danaher of 
the Institute for Policy Studies. This article is part of 
larger work on US policy in Africa which we are currently 
writing. 
1 According to the Observer of London "Rawhide and Rainbow" were the 
code names used by the US Secret Service during 1981 when it 
referred to President Ronald Reagan and his wife Nancy. It is 
significa nt to note that one of the Fir.st Lady's inaugural acts 
upon moving into the White House in 80% black Washington, D.C. 
was t o p urchase a handgun to keep on her bedstand table. 
~he strugg l e to liber a t e poli t ically the rema ining bastions of 
colon i a lism in Sou thern Afri6a, Namibia and South Africa, and the 
s t r u gg le to liberate economically all of Africa are now confronting 
a new o bstacl e , name ly, the Ronald Re agan administration. 
The Reagan a dmi nis tration has unabashedly jumped into bed ~ ith the 
apartheid r eg i me . A docume nt recently released to the world .. ' s :·press 
da ted May 14, 1981 shows Ass i s t a nt S~c r e tary of State for Africa, 
Chester Crocker op i n ing tb S~~re t ary bf State Haigh the f ollowing 
highl y r evealing t houghts : 
"A r e lationsh i p initiated on a cooperative basis could 
mo ve fo rward towa r d a future in which S6uth Africa re-
tur n s to a p l ace w~thin the regional framework of Western 
s ecu r ity in terests . . . We can work to end South Africa's 
polecat status in the wo rld and s eek to restore its place 
as a l egitimate a nd i mpor tant regional actor with whom we 
: c a n : cobperate pragmatic al ly. Y□-u will also need to respond 
wi t h a n artful comb i nat ion of ge s t u r es and hints. The 
g es tures would include , as describe d in the attached paper, 
s mal l but c oncre t e s teps s uch as the norma lization of our 
mi l i tary attach e r e l at ionship. 112 
How d o we e xplain th i s political alliance? Many would say that it 
c a n be ana l y zed i n terms of the current needs for capital, in terms 
of the East-West con f lic t. The Re agan administration, however, 
presents us with a new s itua tion. We would be remiss if ·we failed 
to recogn ize the connec tion be tween the Reagan administrat ion's 
f oreign po l icy o f raci sm and its domest ic policy of racis m. It 
i s n ow clear t hat the current US admin is tration intends to roll 
back all the histor i ca l a dva nc e s which black Americans and other 
Third Wor ld peoples achieve d during the 1960's and 1970's. The 
record tr ill ions of dollars being pou r ed into the Pentagon and 
nuclear warhe ads are coming f rom the wide range of social programs 
- the l ibraries , we lfare a nd unemployme nt bene fits~ school lunch 
progr ams , health p l ans, a s si s tance to the elderly - which the 
Reag an administratio n h as s t e a d ily e liminated. Rarely before has 
r acism been such a c o ns i s t ent component of US government policy 
formul at ions . 
In a Fall 19 80 of f - the - r e cord intervie w, one of Reagan's top 
Af ric a advisor s c omp laine d: "The problem with Reagan is that 
all he knows about Southern Africa is he's on the side of the 
whites ." And thi s perspective is pote ntially the most dangerous 
thing abou t Reagan's policie s. For in this time of acute 
economic crisis the r e is a certain t e rror which is fundamen t ally 
shaping the policies and actions of Western capitalist governments. 
Today' s wor ld with its flux and ins ecurity is a virtual seed-bed 
for the g r owt h o f racist and repressive state philosophies. As the 
empires collaps e, the emper ors become-more and more desperate. 
Ndveli s t Jame s Baldwin stated it well in PCR Information number 11 
when h e said: 
"When Ame ricans (and I would add Europeans) look 
out on the world, they see nothing but dark and 
menacing s~rangers who appear to have no sense of 
rtiythm at a ll, nor any re s pect or affection for 
wh ite people ; and whi te Americans really do not 
k now what to make of a ll this, exc e pt to increase 
the d efense budget." 3 
2 Memor a ndum to the Secreta ry of State from Chester A. Crocker, 
p.6. 
3 Baldwin, Jame s: "Carter this time: Notes on the House of Bondage", 
The Nation, Nove mber 1, 1980 reprinted PCR Infor mation number 11, 
January 1981. 
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Reagan's Cold-War perspective is myopic even by the traditionally 
narrow standards of American anti-Sovietism. "The African problem is 
a Russian weapon aimed at us" is Reagan's summary of a continent 
whose diversity escapes the mind of a failed Hollywood actor. 
Reagan's top aides, though more infof med on African realities, 
share the President's racist/pro-apartheid stance. Secretary of 
State Haig, recently employed by the arms industry, formerly 
served in the Nixon White House, where he is reported to have 
pretended to beat drums on the table every time African affairs 
· were discussed. Haig sees the US and USSR locked in a "resource 
war'' over southern Africa, thus justifying closer ties to Pretoria. 
The former National Security Advisor, Richard Allen, was a 
lobbyist (1973-74) for the Overseas Companies of Portugal, pushing 
for increased US investment in the Portuguese colonies~ Allen also 
worked for John King and his Denver-based King Resources which 
has mining and oil investments in southern Africa. The Assistant _ 
Secretary of State for African Affairs and the main architect of 
Reagan's iouthern Africa policy, Chester Crocker, is married to a 
Rhodesian, owns stock in South African gold mines, and is a long-
time supporter of 'Judas' Savimbi. Another key US supporter of 
Savimbi is Carl Gershman, formerly of Social Democrats/USA but 
now an aide to Jeane Kirkpatrick at the United Nations. The 
current US Ambassador to South Africa is an open, acknowledged 
apologist for South Africa's apartheid. 
Whereas the above facts could be dismissed as mere circumstantial 
evidence, the secret State Department. docurne.nts previously cited 
"prove beyond a sha dow of a doubt that the Reagan administr ation 
is clearly against black interests in Africa", according to 
Randall Robinson of Trans Africa, the group that first received 
the docume nts. The secret memoranda list two major goals of 
Reagan policy in Southern Africa: "to foreclose opportunities for 
growth of Soviet influence in ·southern Africa", and ·"greater 
acceptance of South Africa wi~hin the global framework of Western 
security." Pretoria has long been lobbying for inclusion in a 
South Atlantic version of NATO and now may see its dream become 
a reality. While Haig was meeting in Washington last May with 
South Africa Foreign Minister Pik Botha, General Vernon Walters, 
a former deputy chief of the CIA and a Reagan troubleshooter, 
was meeting in Buenos Aires with several Latin American and South 
African military leaders. The topic was a South Atlantic military 
pact, but the Brazilians, essential to any such alliance, were 
reportedly cool to the idea. Angolan oil and other economic and, 
cultural ties may prove more important to the Brazilian leaders than 
inclusion in a neo-fascist security pact. 
One of the leaked documents reports on the April 15-16 meetings 
between Crocker, South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan, 
and Pik Botha. The memo says that "SAG (South African Governments)' 
sees Savimbi in Angola as buffer for Namibia. Having supported 
him this far, it would damage SAG honor if Savimbi is harmed." 
Crocker responded to this position by arguing that he sees "no 
prospect of military victory for UNITA" but Savimbi's inclusion 
in the Angolan governme nt could be achieve d "by playing on 
divisions · in MPLA." The State Department officials believe Savimbi 
would be forced to go a long with US pl ans because he is d ependent 
,I 
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on aid from "parties we can directly influence" (a possible 
reference to Zaire, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia). 
I, 
The tone of the confidential documents is both arrogant a~d 
threatening. They brag that "African leaders would have no basis 
for resisting" the US plan on Namibia "once they are made to 
realize that they can on1y get a Namibia settlement through us." 
At another point they declare that us recognition of Angola ''is 
out unless the Cubans leave and they (the Angolan government) 
cut a deal with Savimbi .•. if they won't play, we have other 
options." The documents reveal a basic agreement between 
Pretoria and Washington that free elections in Namibia are 
finacceptable because they would result in a SWAPO government, an 
outcome that Reagan and Botha would .rather do without. 
A sample of Reagan administration actions in its first one and 
a half years of operation has given us a clear understanding 
of where things are: 
- pressing for r e peal of the -Clark amendment which outlaws US 
support for Savimbi and new efforts to re- vitalize both UNITA 
and a new version of FNLA; 
- agreeing to train South African Coast Guard personnel; 
- cutting all food aid to Mozambique; 
- the October 1981 visit to the USA by four South African generals; 
- the early 1982 decision by the US Commerce Department permitting 
the sale to the South African Air Force of ten turbopr ops for 
use as air ambulances; 
. the Commerce Department eliminating of licensing restrictions 
on sales to the South African police and military of equipment 
of a "non-military" nature, e.g., clothing, chemicals, 
industrial equipment; 
• the relaxing of the restrictions limiting computer sales to 
South Africa;. 
- the US Immigration Department's efforts to deport South African 
poet Denis Brutus and its refusal to let other South Africans, 
openly active in anti-apartheid organizing, re-enter the USA 
after leaving. 
It is certain that the Reagan administration is intent on continuing 
in its present direction and in fact, upon deepening its ties to 
apartheid. The one possible factor which might limit the love 
affair is strong and coherent domestic opposition from within the 
USA. Such opposition would necessarily have to come first and 
foremost from black Americans. 
There is a final observation I would offer. It is that the crass 
blatency of the Reagari a dmin istr~tion 's embrace of apa rtheid 
is itse lf an empowe ring contribution to the Botha regime . Reagan's 
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stance, his historically inaccurate, but oft-quoted characterization 
of the present leaders of South Africa as world war II allies is 
serving to embolden current South African government actions and 
further, to encourage greater collaboration from other governments 
. ' 
and multinationals. Thus, it is no accident that in February 
this year the largest loan ever given to a South African corporate 
borrower was negotiated by the USA's Citicorp. The$ 100 million, 
seven year loan went to South Africa's African Explosives and 
Chemical Industries (AECI) a firm with two munitions plant in 
the Transvaal and a third ~n the Cape. 
As a response to Reagan's Africa policies and other developments 
like -thi growth of Ku Klux Klan-typ~ groups in the USA, the 
Executive Committee of the National Council of Churches, USA 
voiced publicly, in May 1981, its "fundamental disagreement 
with the new administration's vision of who we are and where 
we are gotng''. It was the first time ever that a national US 
church body had taken so strong a position. So too must others 
throughout the world mobilize and render a strong "NO!" to 
Rawhide and Rainbow, for if we hold our peace, the- very ~tones 
will cry out. 
Prexy Nesbitt 
Program Secretary 
PCR 
